PROSPECTUS
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As of September 30,
2021 (unaudited) |
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(€ in thousands, except
share and per share data) |
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Cash and cash equivalents
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| | | € | 156,141 | | |
Total debt: | | | | | | | |
Lease liability
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| | | | 15,109 | | |
Borrowings
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| | | | 17,513 | | |
Total debt
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| | | | 32,622 | | |
Equity: | | | | | | | |
Equity attributable to owners of the Company
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| | | | 128,606 | | |
Non-controlling interests
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| | | | (585) | | |
Total equity
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| | | | 128,021 | | |
Total capitalization
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| | | € | 160,643 | | |
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Delaware
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The Netherlands
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Duties of Directors
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The board of directors of a Delaware corporation bears the ultimate responsibility for managing the business and affairs of a corporation.
In discharging this function, directors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and to its shareholders. The duty of care generally requires that a director act in good faith, with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances. Under this duty, a director must inform himself of all material information reasonably available regarding a significant transaction. The duty of loyalty requires that a director act in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. He must not use his corporate position for personal gain or advantage. In general, but subject to certain exceptions, actions of a director are presumed to have been made on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation. However, this presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a breach of one of the fiduciary duties. Delaware courts have also imposed a heightened standard of conduct upon directors of a Delaware corporation who take any action designed to defeat a threatened change in control of the corporation.
In addition, under Delaware law, when the board of directors of a Delaware corporation approves the sale or break-up of a corporation, the board of directors may, in certain circumstances, have a duty to obtain the highest value reasonably available to the shareholders.
The Delaware General Corporation Law generally provides for a one-year term for directors, but permits directorships to be divided into up to three classes with up to three-year terms, with the years for each class expiring in different years, if permitted by the certificate of incorporation, an initial bylaw or a bylaw adopted by the shareholders. A director elected to serve a term on a “classified” board of directors may not be removed by
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In the Netherlands, a listed company typically has a two-tier board structure, with a management board comprising the executive directors and a supervisory board comprising the non-executive directors (although a single-tier board system may also be used).
Under Dutch law, the management board is responsible for the day-to-day management and the strategy, policy and operations of a company. The supervisory board is responsible for supervising the conduct of, and providing advice to, the management board and for supervising the company’s general affairs and business. Each managing director and supervisory director has a duty to act in the corporate interest of the company and the business connected with it.
Unlike under Delaware law, under Dutch law the corporate interest extends to the interests of all corporate stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, employees, customers and suppliers. The duty to act in the corporate interest of the company and the business connected with it also applies in the event of a proposed sale or break-up of the company, whereby the specific circumstances generally dictate how such duty is to be applied. Any management board resolution concerning a material change in the identity or character of the company or its business requires shareholders’ approval. The management board may decide in its sole discretion, within the confines of Dutch law and the articles of association, to incur additional indebtedness subject to any contractual restrictions pursuant to our existing financing arrangements.
In contrast to Delaware law, under Dutch law a supervisory board member of a listed company is generally appointed for a maximum term of four years. There is no statutory limit to the number of terms a supervisory board member may serve, although the DCGC recommends that a supervisory board member is appointed for a period of four years and may then be reappointed once for another four-year period. The supervisory board
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| shareholders without cause. There is no limit to the number of terms a director may serve. | | |
member may then subsequently be reappointed again for a period of two years, which appointment may be extended by at most two years. In the event of a reappointment after an eight-year period, reasons should be given in the report of the supervisory board.
A supervisory board member may be removed at any time, with or without cause, by the general meeting of shareholders. Pursuant to our articles of association, our general meeting of shareholders may only adopt a resolution to suspend or dismiss such supervisory board member by at least a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, if such majority represents more than half of the issued share capital of the company, unless the proposal was made by the supervisory board, in which case a simple majority of the votes cast is sufficient.
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Board Vacancies
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| The Delaware General Corporation Law provides that vacancies and newly created directorships may be filled by a majority of the directors then in office (even though less than a quorum) or by a sole remaining director unless (a) otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation or (b) the certificate of incorporation directs that a particular class of stock is to elect such director, in which case a majority of the other directors elected by such class, or a sole remaining director elected by such class, will fill such vacancy. | | |
Under Dutch law, management board members and supervisory board members of a company such as ours are appointed by the general meeting of shareholders, rather than appointed by the management board as is typical for a Delaware corporation.
Under our articles of association, management board members and supervisory board members are appointed by our general meeting of shareholders upon the binding nomination by our supervisory board. However, the general meeting of shareholders, may at all times overrule such binding nomination by a resolution adopted by at least a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, provided such majority represents more than half of our issued share capital, following which our supervisory board shall draw up a new binding nomination.
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Conflict-of-Interest Transactions
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, transactions with directors must be approved by disinterested directors or by the shareholders, or otherwise proven to be fair to the company as of the time it is approved. Such transaction will be void or voidable, unless (1) the material facts of any interested directors’ interests are disclosed or are known to the board of directors and the transaction is approved by the affirmative votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors constitute less than a quorum; (2) the material facts of any interested directors’ interests are disclosed or are known to the | | | Under Dutch law, a management board member and a supervisory board member with a direct or indirect personal interest that conflicts with the interests of the company or of the business connected with it must abstain from participating in the decision- making process (i.e., the deliberations and the decision-making) with respect to the relevant matter. A board member with such a conflict of interest must promptly notify the other directors of his or her conflict. If it becomes apparent that such member was indeed involved in the decision-making process, then such decision may be nullified. | |
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| shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the shareholders; or (3) the transaction is fair to the company as of the time it is approved. | | |
Our articles of association provide that if as a result of conflicts of interest no resolution of the management board can be adopted, the resolution will be adopted by our supervisory board. If as a result of a conflict of interest of supervisory board members no resolution of the supervisory board can be adopted, the resolution can nonetheless be adopted by our supervisory board as if there was no conflict of interest. In that case, each supervisory board member is entitled to participate in the discussion and decision making process and to cast a vote.
Management board members with a conflict of interest remain authorized to represent the company. However, the relevant management board members may under certain circumstances be held personally liable for any damage suffered by the company as a consequence of the transaction.
Agreements entered into with third parties contrary to the rules on decision-making in the case of a conflict of interest, may as a rule not be annulled. Only under special circumstances will a company be able to annul an agreement or claim damages, such as when a third party abuses a conflict of interest situation.
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Proxy Voting by Directors
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| A director of a Delaware corporation may not issue a proxy representing the director’s voting rights as a director. | | | An absent management board member may issue a proxy for a specific meeting of the management board but only in writing to another management board member. An absent supervisory board member may issue a proxy for a specific meeting of the supervisory board but only in writing to another supervisory board member. | |
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Voting Rights
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, each shareholder is entitled to one vote per share of stock, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise. Cumulative voting for elections of directors is not permitted unless the corporation’s certificate of incorporation specifically provides for it. Either the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may specify the number of shares or the amount of other securities that must be represented at a meeting in order to constitute a quorum, but in no event will a quorum consist of less than one-third of the shares entitled to vote at a meeting, except that, where a separate vote by a class or series or classes or series is required, a quorum will consist | | | Under Dutch law, shares have one vote per share, provided such shares have the same nominal value. Our articles of association do not provide quorum requirements generally applicable to general meetings of shareholders. All resolutions of the general meeting of shareholders are adopted by a simple majority of votes cast without quorum requirement, except where Dutch law or our articles of association provide for a special majority and/or quorum in relation to specified resolutions. Each holder of ordinary shares may cast as many votes as it holds shares. The voting rights attached to any shares held by us or our direct or indirect subsidiaries are suspended as long as they are held | |
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of no less than 1/3 of the shares of such class or series or classes or series.
Shareholders as of the record date for the meeting are entitled to vote at the meeting, and the board of directors may fix a record date that is no more than 60 days nor less than 10 days before the date of the meeting, and if no record date is set then the record date is the close of business on the day next preceding the day on which the meeting is held. The determination of the shareholders of record entitled to notice or to vote at a meeting of shareholders shall apply to any adjournment of the meeting, but the board of directors may fix a new record date for the adjourned meeting.
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in treasury. Dutch law does not permit cumulative voting for the election of management board members and supervisory board members.
Pursuant to our articles of association, our management board may determine a record date (registratiedatum) of 28 calendar days prior to a general meeting of shareholders to establish which shareholders and others with meeting rights are entitled to attend and, if applicable, vote in the general meeting of shareholders. The record date, if any, and the manner in which shareholders can register and exercise their rights will be set out in the convocation notice of the general meeting of shareholders. There is no specific provision in Dutch law for adjournments.
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Shareholder Proposals
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| Delaware law does not provide shareholders an express right to put any proposal before a meeting of shareholders, but it provides that a corporation’s bylaws may provide that if the corporation solicits proxies with respect to the election of directors, it may be required to include in its proxy solicitation materials one or more individuals nominated by a shareholder. In keeping with common law, Delaware corporations generally afford shareholders an opportunity to make proposals and nominations provided that they comply with the notice provisions in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws. Additionally, if a Delaware corporation is subject to the SEC’s proxy rules, a shareholder who owns at least $2,000 in market value or 1% of the corporation’s securities entitled to vote for a continuous period of one year as of the date he submits a proposal, may propose a matter for a vote at an annual or special meeting in accordance with those rules. | | |
Pursuant to Dutch law, one or more shareholders or others with meeting rights alone or jointly representing at least 10% of the issued share capital may on their application be authorized by the Dutch Court to convene a general meeting of shareholders if the management board and the supervisory board fail to do so in a timely manner.
The agenda for a general meeting of shareholders must contain such items as the management board, supervisory board or the person or persons convening the meeting decide. Pursuant to Dutch law, unlike under Delaware law, the agenda will also include such other items as one or more shareholders and/or others entitled to attend general meetings of shareholders, alone or jointly representing at least 3% of the issued share capital, may request of the management board in writing and substantiated or by a proposal for a resolution, received by the company no later than on the 60th day before the date of the meeting.
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Action by Written Consent
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| Unless otherwise provided in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation, any action required or permitted to be taken at any annual or special meeting of shareholders of a corporation may be taken without a meeting, without prior notice and without a vote, if one or more consents in writing, setting forth the action to be so taken, are signed by the holders of outstanding stock having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting at which all shares entitled to vote thereon were present and voted. | | | Under Dutch law, shareholders’ resolutions may be adopted in writing without holding a meeting of shareholders, provided (a) the articles of association expressly so allow, (b) no bearer shares or depository receipts are issued, (c) there are no persons entitled to the same rights as holders of depository receipts issued with the company’s cooperation, (d) the management board and supervisory board members have been given the opportunity to give their advice on the resolution, and (e) the resolution is adopted unanimously by all shareholders that are entitled to vote. | |
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| | | | The requirement of unanimity renders the adoption of shareholder resolutions without a meeting not feasible for publicly traded companies. Our articles of association only expressly allow resolutions of the holders of preferred shares to be adopted without holding a meeting. | |
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Shareholder Suits
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a shareholder may bring a derivative action on behalf of the corporation to enforce the rights of the corporation. An individual also may commence a class action suit on behalf of himself and other similarly situated shareholders where the requirements for maintaining a class action under Delaware law have been met. A person may institute and maintain such a suit only if that person was a shareholder at the time of the transaction which is the subject of the suit. In addition, under Delaware case law, the plaintiff normally must be a shareholder not only at the time of the transaction that is the subject of the suit, but also throughout the duration of the derivative suit. Delaware law also requires that the derivative plaintiff make a demand on the directors of the corporation to assert the corporate claim before the suit may be prosecuted by the derivative plaintiff in court, unless such a demand would be futile. | | | Unlike under Delaware law, in the event a third party is liable to a Dutch company, only the company itself can bring a civil action against that party. Individual shareholders do not have the right to bring an action on behalf of the company. An individual shareholder may, in its own name, have an individual right to take action against such third party in the event that the cause for the liability of that third party also constitutes a tortious act directly against that individual shareholder. The Dutch Civil Code provides for the possibility to initiate such actions collectively. A foundation or an association whose objective is to protect the rights of a group of persons having similar interests can institute a collective action. The collective action itself cannot result in an order for payment of monetary damages but may only result in a declaratory judgment (verklaring voor recht). In order to obtain compensation for damages, the foundation or association and the defendant may reach — often on the basis of such declaratory judgment — a settlement. A Dutch court may declare the settlement agreement binding upon all the injured parties with an opt-out choice for an individual injured party. An individual injured party may also itself — outside the collective action — institute a civil claim for damages. | |
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Repurchase of Shares
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a corporation may purchase or redeem its own shares unless the capital of the corporation is impaired or the purchase or redemption would cause an impairment of the capital of the corporation. A Delaware corporation may, however, purchase or redeem out of capital any of its preferred shares or, if no preferred shares are outstanding, any of its own shares if such shares will be retired upon acquisition and the capital of the corporation will be reduced in accordance with specified limitations. | | |
Under Dutch law, a company such as ours may not subscribe for newly issued shares in its own capital. Such company may, however, repurchase its existing and outstanding shares or depository receipts if permitted under its articles of association.
We may acquire our shares, subject to applicable provisions and restrictions of Dutch law and our articles of association, to the extent that: (i) such shares are fully paid-up; (ii) such shares are acquired for no consideration or such repurchase would not cause our shareholders’ equity to fall below an amount equal to the sum of the paid-up and called-up part of the issued share capital and the reserves we are required to maintain pursuant to
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Dutch law or our articles of association; and (iii) after the acquisition of shares, we and our subsidiaries would not hold, or would not hold as pledgees, shares having an aggregate nominal value that exceeds 50% of our issued share capital.
Other than shares acquired for no consideration or by universal succession, our management board may acquire shares only if our general meeting of shareholders has authorized the management board to do so. An authorization by the general meeting of shareholders for the acquisition of shares can be granted for a maximum period of 18 months. Such authorization must specify the number of shares that may be acquired, the manner in which these shares may be acquired and the price range within which the shares may be acquired.
No authorization of the general meeting of shareholders is required if listed ordinary shares are acquired by us with the intention of transferring such ordinary shares to our employees under an applicable employee stock purchase plan. Our articles of association further provide that a resolution of our management board to acquire fully paid-up shares in our share capital, requires the approval of our supervisory board.
On May 19, 2021, our general meeting of shareholders adopted a resolution pursuant to which our management board will be authorized to acquire (i) up to 10% of the issued share capital of the Company plus, in case of a material reorganization of the capital structure of the Company, (ii) an additional 10% of the issued share capital of the Company, by any means, including through derivative products, purchases on any stock exchange, through any private purchase or block trade, or otherwise, for a price that is between 0.01 US Dollar and an amount which is not higher than 110% of the average market price of such ordinary shares on Nasdaq (with the market price deemed to be the average of the closing price on each of the five consecutive days of trading preceding the three trading days prior to the date of acquisition), for a period of eighteen (18) months with effect from the general meeting of shareholders. In this respect, the words “issued share capital” means the Company’s issued share capital from time to time. For the avoidance of doubt, the issued share capital includes treasury shares.
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Anti-Takeover Provisions
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In addition to other aspects of Delaware law governing fiduciary duties of directors during a potential takeover, the Delaware General Corporation Law also contains a business combination statute that protects Delaware companies from hostile takeovers and from actions following the takeover by prohibiting some transactions once an acquirer has gained a significant holding in the corporation.
Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law prohibits “business combinations,” including mergers, sales and leases of assets, issuances of securities and similar transactions by a corporation or a subsidiary with an interested shareholder that beneficially owns 15% or more of a corporation’s voting stock (or which is an affiliate or associate of the corporation and owned 15% or more of the corporation’s outstanding voting stock within the past three years), within three years after the person becomes an interested shareholder, unless:
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the transaction that will cause the person to become an interested shareholder is approved by the board of directors of the target prior to the transactions;
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after the completion of the transaction in which the person becomes an interested shareholder, the interested shareholder holds at least 85% of the voting stock of the corporation not including shares owned by persons who are directors and also officers of interested shareholders and shares owned by specified employee benefit plans; or
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after the person becomes an interested shareholder, the business combination is approved by the board of directors of the corporation and holders of at least 66.67% of the outstanding voting stock, excluding shares held by the interested shareholder.
A Delaware corporation may elect not to be governed by Section 203 by a provision contained in the original certificate of incorporation of the corporation or an amendment to the original certificate of incorporation or to the bylaws of the company.
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Under Dutch law, various protective measures are possible and permissible within the boundaries set by Dutch statutory law and Dutch case law. We have adopted several provisions that may have the effect of making a takeover of our company more difficult or less attractive, including:
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the authorization of a class of preferred shares that may be issued to a protection foundation to which we have granted a perpetual and repeatedly exercisable call;
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a provision that our management board members and our supervisory board members may only be appointed upon a binding nomination by our supervisory board, which can be set aside by a two-thirds majority of our shareholders representing more than half of our issued share capital;
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a provision that our management board members and supervisory board members may only be removed by our general meeting of shareholders by at least a two-thirds majority of votes cast representing more than 50% of our issued share capital (unless the removal was proposed by the supervisory board); and
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a requirement that certain matters, including an amendment of our articles of association, may only be brought to our shareholders for a vote upon a proposal by our management board that has been approved by our supervisory board.
As indicated above, we have adopted an anti-takeover measure by granting a perpetual and repeatedly exercisable call option to the protection foundation, which confers upon the protection foundation the right to acquire, under certain conditions, the number of preferred shares described above. The issuance of such preferred shares will occur upon the protection foundation’s exercise of the call option and will not require shareholder consent. Such a measure has the effect of making a takeover of us more difficult or less attractive and as a result, our shareholders may be unable to benefit from a change of control and realize any potential change of control premium which may materially and adversely affect the market price of our ordinary shares.
In addition, our boards need to act in the interest of ProQR, our business and take into account the interests of all our stakeholders, including by
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promoting the sustainable success of our business and the creation of long term value for us and our business. The boards are responsible to determine our strategy and choosing our strategic direction. In doing so and depending on the circumstances they may decide to not entertain a proposed takeover or other strategic proposal, even if the proposal is supported by the majority of our shareholders and/or would create more shareholder value. The boards may also use their general authority under Dutch corporate law and the DCGC to not co-operate with a proposal, e.g. by not providing due diligence and or by not cooperating with shareholder proposals to adopt resolutions in a general shareholder meeting that may change our strategy for instance by invoking the maximum 180 days response time set out in the DCGC.
As of May 1, 2021, the Statutory Reflection Period for Listed Companies came into force. The purpose is to give the management board of a listed company more time for careful policymaking to weigh the interests of the company and its stakeholders in the event of an unsolicited takeover bid or other pressure being put on the management board to change the course of the company, for example from activist shareholders. The management board of a listed company may invoke a reflection period of up to 250 days in the event of: (i) a request by one or more shareholders for consideration of a proposal to appoint, suspend or dismiss one or more members of the management of supervisory board, or (ii) when a public bid has been announced or made for the shares without agreement having been reached on the bid with the target company. The decision by the management board to invoke the reflection period is subject to supervisory board approval. In addition, to invoke the reflection period, the request under (i) and the public bid under (ii) must in the view of the management board be substantially contrary to the interest of the company and its affiliated enterprise and the reflection period should be used for careful policy making.
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Inspection of Books and Records
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, any shareholder may inspect for any proper purpose the corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its shareholders and its other books and records during the corporation’s usual hours of business. | | |
Our shareholders’ register is available for inspection by the shareholders and usufructuaries and pledgees whose particulars must be registered therein.
Our management board and our supervisory board provide our shareholders, at the general meeting of shareholders, with all information that the general
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| | | | meeting of shareholders reasonably requests unless doing so would be contrary to an overriding interest of ours. Our management board or our supervisory board will in principle give a reason for electing not to provide such information on the basis of overriding interest. | |
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Removal of Directors
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, any director or the entire board of directors may be removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at an election of directors, except (a) unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise, in the case of a corporation whose board of directors is classified, shareholders may effect such removal only for cause, or (b) in the case of a corporation having cumulative voting, if less than the entire board of directors is to be removed, no director may be removed without cause if the votes cast against his removal would be sufficient to elect him if then cumulatively voted at an election of the entire board of directors, or, if there are classes of directors, at an election of the class of directors of which he is a part. | | | Under our articles of association, the general meeting of shareholders is at all times entitled to suspend or remove a management board member or supervisory board member. The general meeting of shareholders may only adopt a resolution to suspend or remove such a member by at least a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, provided such majority represents more than half of the issued share capital of our company, unless the proposal was made by our supervisory board in which case a simple majority of the votes cast is sufficient. | |
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Preemptive Rights
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, shareholders have no preemptive rights to subscribe to additional issues of stock or to any security convertible into such stock unless, and except to the extent that, such rights are expressly provided for in the certificate of incorporation. | | |
Under our articles of association, the preemptive rights in respect of newly issued ordinary shares may be restricted or excluded by a resolution of the general meeting of shareholders upon proposal of our management board, which proposal must have been approved by our supervisory board. Our general meeting of shareholders may authorize our management board to restrict or exclude the preemptive rights in respect of newly issued ordinary shares. Such authorization for the management board can be granted and extended, in each case for a period not exceeding five years. A resolution of the general meeting of shareholders to restrict or exclude the preemptive rights or to designate our management board as the authorized body to do so requires at least a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, if less than one half of our issued share capital is represented at the meeting.
On May 19, 2021, our general meeting of shareholders adopted a resolution pursuant to which our management board, subject to approval of the supervisory board, is authorized to, in accordance with applicable laws and Nasdaq listing rules and for a period of 5 years from the date of
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the resolution of the general meeting of shareholders: (a) issue ordinary shares up to 100% of the Company’s authorized share capital for general purposes and issuances under Company’s stock option plans with the proviso that the issuances under stock option plans is limited to 15% of the Company’s issued share capital from time-to-time (minus any treasury shares); (b) grant rights to subscribe for ordinary shares as described under (a); and (c) limit or exclude the pre-emptive rights of holders of ordinary shares, which delegation shall include the authority to determine the price and further terms and conditions of any such share issuance or grant.
No preemptive rights apply in respect of preferred shares.
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Dividends
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, a Delaware corporation may, subject to any restrictions contained in its certificate of incorporation, pay dividends out of its surplus (the excess of net assets over capital), or in case there is no surplus, out of its net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared or the preceding fiscal year (provided that the amount of the capital of the corporation is not less than the aggregate amount of the capital represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference upon the distribution of assets). In determining the amount of surplus of a Delaware corporation, the assets of the corporation, including stock of subsidiaries owned by the corporation, must be valued at their fair market value as determined by the board of directors, without regard to their historical book value. Dividends may be paid in the form of ordinary shares, property or cash. | | |
Dutch law provides that dividends may only be distributed after adoption of the annual accounts by the general meeting of shareholders from which it appears that such dividend distribution is allowed. Moreover, dividends may be distributed only to the extent the shareholders’ equity exceeds the sum of the paid-up and called-up share capital and the reserves that must be maintained under Dutch law or the articles of association. Interim dividends may be declared as provided in the articles of association and may be distributed to the extent that the shareholders’ equity exceeds the paid-up and called-up share capital and the reserves that must be maintained under Dutch law or the articles of association as apparent from an (interim) financial statement. Interim dividends should be regarded as advances on the final dividend to be declared with respect to the financial year in which the interim dividends have been declared. Should it be determined after adoption of the annual accounts with respect to the relevant financial year that the distribution was not permissible, the company may reclaim the paid interim dividends as unduly paid.
Under our articles of association, a (cumulative) dividend is first paid out of the profit, if available for distribution, on any preferred shares, of which none will be outstanding on completion of an offering. Any amount remaining out of the profit is carried to reserve as the management board determines. After reservation by the management board of any profit, the remaining profit will be at the disposal of the general meeting of shareholders.
Dividends shall be payable in such currency and on
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| | | | such date as determined by the management board. Claims for payment of dividends not made within five years from the date that such dividends became payable will lapse and any such amounts will be considered to have been for feited to us. | |
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Appraisal Rights and Shareholder Vote on Certain Reorganizations
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Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the vote of a majority of the outstanding shares of capital stock entitled to vote thereon generally is necessary to approve a merger or consolidation or the sale of substantially all of the assets of a corporation. The Delaware General Corporation Law permits a corporation to include in its certificate of incorporation a provision requiring for any corporate action the vote of a larger portion of the stock or of any class or series of stock than would otherwise be required.
The Delaware General Corporation Law provides for stockholder appraisal rights, or the right to demand payment in cash of the judicially determined fair value of the stockholder’s shares, in connection with certain mergers and consolidations.
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Under Dutch law, resolutions of the management board concerning a material change in the identity or character of the company or its business are subject to the approval of the general meeting of shareholders. Such changes include in any event:
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a transfer of all or materially all of our business to a third party;
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the entry into or termination of a long-lasting alliance of the company or of a subsidiary either with another entity or company, or as a fully liable partner of a limited partnership or partnership, if this alliance or termination is of significant importance for the company; and
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the acquisition or disposition of an interest in the capital of a company by the company or by a subsidiary with a value of at least one third of the value of the assets, according to the balance sheet with explanatory notes or, if the company prepares a consolidated balance sheet, according to the consolidated balance sheet with explanatory notes in the company’s most recently adopted annual accounts.
The concept of appraisal rights does not exist under Dutch law. However, pursuant to Dutch law, a shareholder who for its own account (or together with its group companies) holds at least 95% of the company’s issued capital may institute proceedings against the company’s other shareholders jointly for the transfer of their shares to that shareholder. The proceedings are held before the Enterprise Chamber of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (Ondernemingskamer), which may grant the claim for squeeze-out in relation to all minority shareholders and will determine the price to be paid for the shares, if necessary after appointment of one or three experts who will offer an opinion to the Enterprise Chamber on the value of the shares to be transferred.
Furthermore, Dutch law provides that, to the extent the acquiring company in a cross-border merger is organized under the laws of another EU member state, a shareholder of a Dutch disappearing company who has voted against the cross-border
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Delaware
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The Netherlands
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| | | | merger may file a claim with the Dutch company for compensation. The compensation is to be determined by one or more independent experts. | |
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Compensation of Directors
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| Under the Delaware General Corporation Law, the shareholders do not generally have the right to approve the compensation policy for the board of directors or the senior management of the corporation, although certain aspects of the compensation policy may be subject to shareholder vote due to the provisions of federal securities and tax law. | | |
In contrast to Delaware law, under Dutch law and our articles of association, the general meeting of shareholders must upon the proposal of our supervisory board adopt the compensation policy for the management board, which includes the outlines of the compensation of any members who serve on our management board. The supervisory board determines the compensation of the management board members in accordance with the compensation policy. A proposal by the supervisory board with respect to compensation schemes in the form of shares or rights to shares is submitted for approval by the supervisory board to the general meeting of shareholders. Such proposal must set out at least the maximum number of shares or rights to shares to be granted to the management board and the criteria for granting such shares.
The general meeting of shareholders may determine the compensation of supervisory board members. The supervisory directors will be reimbursed for their expenses.
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Name of Selling Shareholders
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Number of
Ordinary Shares Owned Prior to Offering |
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Maximum
Number of Ordinary Shares to be Sold Pursuant to this Prospectus |
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Number of
Ordinary Shares Owned After Offering |
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Percentage of
Ordinary Shares Owned After Offering (to the extent greater than 1%) |
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Eli Lilly and Company(1)
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| | | | 3,989,976(2) | | | | | | 3,989,976 | | | | | | — | | | | | | — | | |
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SEC registration fee
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| | | $ | 2,925.68 | | |
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Nasdaq fees
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| | | | * | | |
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Printing and engraving expenses
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| | | | * | | |
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Legal fees and expenses
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| | | | * | | |
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Accountants’ fees and expenses
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| | | | * | | |
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Trustee’s fees and expenses
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| | | | * | | |
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Miscellaneous costs
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| | | | * | | |
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Total
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| | | $ | * | | |